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As in other countries, improving collaboration between health and social care services
is a long-established objective of English social policy. A more recent priority has
been the personalisation of social care for adults and older people through the
introduction of individualised funding arrangements. Individual budgets (IBs) were piloted
in 13 English local authorities from 2005 to 2007, but they explicitly excluded NHS
resources and services. This article draws on interviews with lead ofﬁcers responsible for
implementing IBs. It shows how the contexts of local collaboration created problems for
the implementation of the personalisation pilots, jeopardised inter-sectoral relationships
and threatened some of the collaborative arrangements that had developed over the
previous decade. Personal budgets for some health services have subsequently also been
piloted. These will need to build upon the experiences of the social care IB pilots,
so that policy objectives of personalisation do not undermine previous collaborative
achievements.
I n t roduct ion
This article examines the intersection of two policy themes: inter-sectoral and service
partnerships and personalised approaches to delivering health and social care. It describes
the introduction of personalised funding arrangements in adult social care in England
and the impact on local collaborative relationships with National Health Service (NHS)
partners and services. The article outlines the relevant policy contexts of pressures to
improve collaboration between NHS and social care services and the more recent
extension of personalisation into adult social care. It reports evidence, from a major
evaluation, of the difficulties experienced by local service managers in managing these
dual policy imperatives. The article concludes with recommendations for policy and
research.
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Co l l abo ra t i on be tween hea l t h and s oc i a l c a r e i n Eng l and
Positive outcomes for service users are widely believed to require close relationships
between services at the point of delivery (Newman et al., 2008). However, relationships
between the English NHS and local authority social care services have a long and
problematic history, originating in the funding mechanisms and structures of the post-
war welfare state. The NHS was assigned responsibility for ‘treatment’ and ‘cure’, with
local authorities providing longer-term personal and practical support to older and
disabled people (Means and Smith, 1998). These responsibilities, underpinned by different
accountability mechanisms, remain fundamentally unchanged. Meanwhile, budgetary
constraints create continuing pressures to shift demand and costs between the two sectors.
Following the election of the Labour government in 1997, a plethora of measures
promoting collaboration between health and social care services was introduced (Hudson,
1999). These included statutory duties for NHS organisations and local authorities to work
in partnership, ‘ring-fenced’ funding to develop joint local services (particularly those
aimed at preventing hospital admission and supporting early discharge), national service
frameworks setting benchmarks across both sectors and the relaxation of legal barriers
to closer organisational collaboration (see Glendinning et al., 2003). The latter involved
pooling health and social care budgets for specific services, joint or lead commissioning
and/or integrating health and social care staff and services within a single organisational
framework.
Many local joint services have resulted, particularly for older people, people with
learning disabilities and those with mental health problems. For example, intermediate
care services to support early hospital discharge have been established in most English
localities, jointly commissioned and funded by NHS and local authority partners and
employing nursing, therapist and care staff (DH, 2000; University of Leeds, 2005).
Assessments of older people are expected to cover both health and social care needs
(DH, 2001). Joint strategic needs assessments and joint commissioning between local
authorities and NHS organisations are widespread across many areas of adult services.
Collaboration and partnership are now mainstream activities for many managers and
practitioners in both sectors (Glendinning and Clarke, 2002).
Persona l i s a t i on i n adu l t soc i a l ca r e
Over the same period, pressures for more personalised social care arrangements
developed, first from younger disabled people and latterly promoted by government
as mainstream policy in England. Policy ambitions expanded, from enabling disabled
and older people to configure their social care support to meet individual preferences,
to individualised funding allocations with each user being awarded a budget from which
their desired support arrangements are funded.
The option of receiving a cash ‘direct payment’ (DP) equivalent to services in kind was
introduced in England from 1997. Low and variable take-up prompted further measures
requiring local authorities to promote the direct payment option (Ferna´ndez et al., 2007).
Meanwhile, the social enterprise organisation in Control developed new techniques for
determining individualised funding allocations and promoted greater flexibility in their
use by people with learning disabilities. Thus in Control encouraged the purchase of
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mainstream social, transport, leisure and daytime activity services, aimed at promoting
social inclusion and integration (Tyson et al., 2010).
Building on these experiences, a major review of policies for disabled people
(Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, 2005) proposed the piloting of individual budgets (IBs).
IBs would bring together the different resources to which a disabled individual was
entitled, reduce multiple assessments and allow greater choice and flexibility in the use of
these resources to achieve agreed outcomes. Such mechanisms would enhance consumer
choice and reduce provider power, both considered to be essential features of public
sector modernisation (Clarke et al., 2007). However, the pilots excluded NHS resources
and services. This appeared inconsistent with the previous decade of policies that had
encouraged collaboration between health and social care. It raises the question of how the
modernisation goal of improving collaboration was to be combined with other goals of
choice, control and personalisation. As Newman et al. (2008: 547) comment, ‘The trope
of “partnership” is particularly significant in that this not only suggests tensions within the
social care system but also between different government priorities, and between different
modernisation programmes.’
The ind iv idua l budget p i lo t p ro jec ts and eva lua t ion
Individual budgets were piloted in 13 English local authorities between 2005 and 2007.
IBs could be taken as a cash direct payment, or held by a third party (care manager,
service provider, family member) on the user’s behalf. Flexibility and innovation in the
use of IBs were encouraged, including spending on mainstream commercial services
instead of conventional social care. Between them, the pilots offered IBs to older people,
people with learning disabilities, mental health service users and people with physical
and/or sensory impairments.
The pilots were subject to a major evaluation (Glendinning et al., 2008). This aimed
to assess whether IBs improved outcomes for disabled and older people compared with
conventional services and, if so, at what cost. The multi-method design included a
randomised controlled trial to compare costs and outcomes between IBs and standard
services (including direct payments). It found people receiving an IB were more likely to
feel in control of their daily lives, compared to those receiving conventional social care
support; satisfaction was highest among those with mental health and physical disabilities.
Overall, there was limited evidence that IBs were cost-effective with respect to social care
outcomes and even weaker evidence with respect to psychological wellbeing and satis-
faction. However, there were marked differences between user groups in these findings.
The evaluation included an in-depth examination of the contexts and processes
(Pawson and Tilley, 1997) of implementing IBs. This generated potential explanations of
the quantitative outcome measures generated by the trial and details of the challenges if
IBs were implemented more widely. This article uses data derived from semi-structured
interviews conducted with the social care lead managers responsible for implementing
IBs, six months into the pilots and again 15 months later. These managers had extensive
strategic and operational contacts with local NHS counterparts throughout the pilot
projects.
During the first round of interviews, IB lead officers were asked about existing
partnerships with local NHS organisations; the anticipated implications of these
arrangements for implementing IBs, particularly for those groups also using NHS services;
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and how any difficulties might be addressed. During the second round of interviews,
officers were asked what problems they had actually experienced and how these had
been resolved.
The interviews were tape-recorded, transcribed and coded using MAXqda. All data
relating to relationships with NHS partners, health services and the use of IBs for health-
related purposes were extracted from the interviews. Repeated reading of the data,
by two of the research team independently, identified four main themes: assessments,
IBs for people with NHS continuing care and mental health care needs, difficulties in
distinguishing between social and health care needs and outcomes and the wider impacts
on collaboration between health and social care services in the 13 pilot localities. First,
the collaborative contexts within which social care IBs were piloted are described.
Adu l t soc ia l ca re and NHS par tners – loca l con tex ts and ant ic ipa ted
cha l l enges
All pilot site lead officers reported extensive collaboration between local adult social
care and health services. Everywhere, at least some services were jointly commissioned;
pooled budgets, lead commissioning and integrated provision were particularly common
in mental health and learning disability services:
We actually have a section 31 agreement on mental health, which is around integrated service
provision . . . We had a proper full pooled budget for the [integrated community equipment
service] . . . we have a pooled budget for the learning disability development fund . . . and we
are almost at the point of concluding . . . a pooled budget partnership arrangement . . . We have
. . . a number of posts that are jointly funded partnership posts. [Site 3]
Interviewees anticipated from the outset that IBs would have strategic and operational
implications for their relationships with health partners. Where services were delivered
by an integrated health and social care organisation, social care managers would have
no direct managerial control over implementation. Where social care resources were
committed to pooled budgets, these would not be available for social care IBs:
the LD [learning disability] budget, which is about – I don’t know, 60:40 adult social care:health,
so I mean that’s a lot of money that’s excluded from the individual budget . . . [Site 6]
As noted above, social care IBs could be taken as a cash direct payment, but legal and
practice opinion was unclear as to whether the same applied to assessed health needs and
NHS responsibilities (Glendinning et al., 2000; Glendinning, 2006). However, in some
sites, informal arrangements – themselves significant indicators of close collaboration –
had been agreed to maximise continuity for service users. Thus, some sites had agreed
with their NHS counterparts that people receiving social care direct payments, whose
condition deteriorated to the extent that they became eligible for fully funded NHS
continuing care,1 could continue to receive this as a direct payment:
We’re one of the few authorities that have got, have persuaded our [primary care trust] to allow
us to continue offering direct payments, even though we’re then passing the full costs of the
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direct payments onto them . . . because that individual has been deemed to be in need of 100
per cent continuing care. [Site 8]
IB lead officers unanimously criticised the IB pilots for excluding health funding, because
of the potential disruption to existing collaborative arrangements:
to be honest, one of the big disappointments of IBs for us in learning disabilities was that it
excluded the health economy and it was just about the social care economy . . . ‘Oh, this is
really holistic and it’s about your entire life – oh, apart from your health needs’. [Site 6]
Spec ific imp lementa t ion prob lems
Over and above this general disappointment, there were specific areas in which
implementing IBs in social care alone was highly problematic.
S e l f - a s s e s s m e n t s v e r s u s i n t e g r a t e d a s s e s s m e n t s
IBs brought new opportunities for user-led self-assessment of social care support needs.
However, this was not compatible with existing practices of integrated assessments to
cover social care and health needs, particularly for older people (DH, 2001).
We’ve certainly agreed that we don’t drop our health needs assessment element . . . You’ve
actually got to make sure you’ve got a holistic assessment, your health colleagues are on board
. . . [Site 7]
By the second round of interviews, another site had adapted its self-assessment
documentation so that health needs and service needs could be identified:
When we’re completing the self-assessment we might also identify some health needs in there
. . . the bottom line is that health are still contributing to the outcomes in that person’s plan.
[Site 9]
I B s an d N H S c o n t i n u i n g c a r e
In the first round of interviews, two sites reported previous informal agreements to include
NHS funding in cash direct payments for people who were entitled to fully funded NHS
continuing care. By the second round of interviews, four more sites reported that a few
people with very complex needs had IBs that included some NHS funding:
there are . . . several people in there who have health money within their individual budget
because it’s [reclaimed] from the NHS. If it’s for someone with a learning disability, it [NHS
funding] might be spent on the additional support they need to manage their risky behaviour.
[Site 3]
However, other sites had experienced considerable difficulty in including NHS funds in
social care IBs, particularly for people who had received their IB as a cash payment, but
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whose condition deteriorated to the extent that they became eligible for fully funded NHS
continuing care:
We’ve got a number of direct payments where we’d set up the direct payment, the person’s health
had deteriorated, we’d persuaded our [NHS] colleagues that they should accept full financial
responsibility for the package but we really didn’t want to take away from the individual or
from the families concerned that flexibility . . . It’s going to be frustrating, I think, not to be able
to offer some of those individuals the full flexibility of an individual budget. [Site 8]
Indeed, additional difficulties arose during the IB pilots following publication of new
guidelines on NHS continuing care. These stated that:
NHS services cannot be provided as part of an individual budget or through direct payments
. . . This means that when an individual begins to receive NHS continuing healthcare they may
experience a loss of control over their care, which they had previously exercised through direct
payments or similar. (DH, 2007a: para 77)
Consequently, in at least four pilot sites previous informal arrangements had been
terminated; this was considered to curtail opportunities for personalisation and choice by
people with unstable or deteriorating conditions:
Continuing healthcare, that’s another group of people where we’re really, really struggling . . .
those people who have previously enjoyed direct payments have got to sack all their [personal
assistant] staff because they’ve got more ill. [Site 10]
Indeed, in one site, a review of local NHS arrangements had pronounced such
arrangements to be illegal:
We were appalled at the way it was carried out . . . Those service users were previously getting
a direct payment until – the direct payment now stops ‘We’re not going to fund it, instead you’re
going to have a conventional service’ and the only provider they’re going to use is a provider
that . . . is no longer used by the local authority because they’re rubbish! [Site 8]
Another site anticipated that restrictions on the deployment of NHS funds as a direct
payment would deter potentially eligible people from applying if they risked losing the
flexibility of their IB. This meant that the local authority would continue to fund very high
levels of support that were actually a NHS responsibility.
Strong arguments were put forward for including NHS continuing care funding in
IBs:
I think there’s been a missed opportunity . . . For me continuing health care is so individualised
that it would fit beautifully into this model . . . Is it not an individualised budget already? It can
only be spent on the person. [Site 2]
it would be just absolutely lovely to have access to free nursing care and continuing care
monies to actually use to buy all of the support, to have someone have nursing care in their
156
Personalisation and Partnership
own home . . . People at end-of-life care and things like that, having access to health funds very
quickly that we could use in a very flexible way. [Site 13]
Another IB lead officer pointed out that although the new NHS guidelines advocated
personalised commissioning of NHS continuing care, this was:
bunkum really, ‘cause actually you know, it’s the person being in control, that’s the thing that
matters. You can’t commission, if you’re commissioning for somebody, the whole point of DPs
and whatever is that they commission themselves. [Site 4]
I n d i v i d u a l b u d g e t s an d m e n t a l h e a l t h s e r v i c e s
A further area of difficulty was reported from the five pilot sites offering IBs to people with
mental health problems (Manthorpe et al., 2008):
Mental health needs don’t fit neatly into health or social care do they? [Site 4]
These pilot sites had previously established integrated mental health services, often
involving pooled budgets and integrated organisations providing both health and social
care. They therefore had to identify and cost those social care resources that could
be made available for IBs. Thus in one site only a small proportion of the social care
mental health budget, currently used for case-by-case spot purchase of the day and
other support services, was available for allocation through IBs. Another site came to a
working agreement with NHS colleagues over their joint-funded mental health service –
‘if it’s treatment it’s health and everything else is social care’ – but recognised that this
arrangement might not be financially sustainable in the longer term. In two sites, the NHS
partner agreed to transfer social care’s contribution to a joint-funded mental health service
back to the authority if the latter could estimate how many service users would take up
an IB. However, much of the social care contribution was used to fund day services from
which only limited resources could be withdrawn, at least in the short-term, without
destabilizing existing provision.
Implementing social care IBs in integrated mental health services was also challenging
because the front-line staff on whom implementation depended were NHS employees,
over whom social care managers had no direct managerial control:
it’s an integrated mental health service, so what we’re doing is quite a radical shift in terms of
social care policy being delivered by a health service and that certainly had its tensions in terms
of we don’t have direct operational management responsibility for the people we’re asking to
deliver this. [Site 4]
Furthermore, the costs of supporting someone with a mental health problem through an
IB fell entirely on the local authority adult social care budget, rather than being met from
a joint budget shared with NHS partners:
At the moment, there are clear pressures in terms of us providing a social care service that
might have previously been jointly funded by health and social care . . . We’re taking half the
pot and saying – and offering it to all the people. [Site 4]
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it’s costing social care more but is it costing health less, is the big [question]. . . [Site 11]
Perceived shifts in costs to the local authority were accentuated where users had regarded
conventional mental health services as stigmatising or not beneficial, but where the
flexibility offered by IBs – particularly where it could be taken as a DP – was far more
attractive:
Our problem is that we can’t actually cost those services with people who’ve been going to
an acute day hospital; they just haven’t been using social care services . . . We have growing
numbers in terms of direct payments, again that’s an issue. So it’s not just about individual
budgets, but clearly we’re making more and more direct payments where we would once have
provided a day service that was jointly funded. [Site 4]
U s e s a n d ou t c o m e s o f i n d i v i d u a l bu d g e t s
Interviewees reported difficulty ensuring that social care-funded IBs were used to buy
social, as distinct from health, care. This challenge arose across the full range of user
groups offered IBs, but it was most pronounced in relation to mental health services:
Ofﬁcer 1: We’ve had one [IB] signed off where the person wants to use some of the money for
acupuncture.
Ofﬁcer 2: Acupuncture, yeah, yeah. So, complementary therapies probably and massage . . .
Ofﬁcer 1: . . . things like gym membership and you know, that sort of thing where maybe health
should be providing physiotherapy. [Site 11]
they’re gonna want physiotherapy, they’re gonna want aromatherapy . . . strictly we can’t put
that in an IB and as a Council we can’t say that they can have it because it’s our funding. . . but
some of those kinds of low level health services are critical to people’s well-being. [Site 1]
Officers in the latter site tried to ensure that IBs were not used for services that could be
funded from other sources, although they recognised that they had limited mechanisms
for doing so once an IB support plan had been approved. However, officers in another
site were less concerned about ensuring that IBs were used only for social care, arguing
that it was user outcomes that mattered:
None of us live in a silo, I don’t mind if somebody wants to use the allocation they have as
long as they can meet their needs overall . . . We’ve got people who go dancing or fishing, it
actually keeps their mental health at a level where they feel relaxed, they feel comfortable . . .
[Site 2]
Such flexibility raised a number of issues. First, it meant using social care resources for
activities that could be considered NHS responsibilities, where outcomes were primarily
health-related and where potential benefits, in terms of reduced demand for services, also
accrued to the NHS:
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The chap [whose IB was paying for a photography course] was having . . . three days in an
acute hospital funded by health . . . His [Individual] Budget was about £4,000 . . . But actually
the saving, you know, I don’t know how much those days at an acute day hospital costs, but I
suspect it’s more than £4,000 a year. [Site 11]
Secondly, although an IB might be used for health-related support and have health
benefits, as with other social care services the whole amount was liable for means-
tested charges, in contrast to the services provided through the NHS that were free of
charge. This was considered unfair to IB holders:
Charging is the big elephant in the room, isn’t it? I mean, you still have to separate out which
element is social care and which element is healthcare, because we can’t afford to say, ‘You
can have it for nothing’. [Site 7]
A further difficulty, also reported in earlier research on direct payments (Glendinning
et al., 2000), concerned responsibilities for training and risk management in respect of
personal assistants (PAs), employed by IB holders to provide social and personal care,
who also undertook health-related tasks:
We already have a basic training programme for personal assistants, but one of the things that
we need to deal with, I think, is for people who’ve got a joint package . . . some of those PAs
need training in relation to meeting the individual’s health needs, and who should pay for that?
[Site 9]
we’ve had this with direct payments – we’ve had PAs doing tasks that frankly are really health
tasks and there’s some concern about safety . . . around what’s safe. [Site 7]
Other evidence from the IB evaluation suggests that these issues were recognised by
training officers in some pilot sites. One site had begun to work with its NHS partner to
develop training for PAs working with people with extensive healthcare needs; another
had provided information for IB users on safe practice in employing PAs (Manthorpe
et al., 2010).
Overall, restricting IBs to social care funding only was expected to risk damaging
relationships with NHS partners and undermine earlier collaborative achievements:
There have been issues about what should be health funding and what should be social care
funding . . . the danger is that we each go off at a tangent and what we’re trying to do is to be
working more together. [Site 11]
If we’re going to move towards any form of integration of our services with our health partners,
then that funding issue is always going to stand in the way so it’s got to be sorted. [Site 8]
Discuss ion and conc lus ions
As Newman et al. (2008) comment, English adult social care has been subject to
multiple modernising pressures, but these are not always wholly mutually compatible.
In this instance, aspirations for users to play a bigger role as active agents in the
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co-production of their own services (Leadbeater, 2004) created tensions with more
managerialist imperatives to improve efficiency through inter-sectoral collaboration. This
article has reported the impact and challenges of implementing a new policy to extend
personalisation, choice and control in adult social care, in the context of the history – and
considerable success – of previous measures intended to develop partnerships between
local health and social care services. It illustrates the tensions between these two cross-
cutting policy themes and, in particular, the threats to existing collaborative relationships
from the introduction of personalisation in one sector only.
Thus, the introduction of personalisation into involving social care alone was
problematic because an extensive range of adult services was now jointly commissioned
and/or funded, or delivered through integrated organisations. This was especially the case
with mental health services. Other problems were encountered in the transition from
social care to NHS funded continuing care and in attempts to restrict the spending of IBs
to ‘social-’ rather than ‘health’-related support.
More generally, there were signs of the re-emergence of the ‘boundary’ disputes that
had characterised health–social care relationships prior to the major collaborative policy
imperatives from 1997 onwards. Social care officers began again to note with concern
their spending on health-related items and the potential benefits of that spending for NHS
budgets. While this cost-shifting might be manageable in a short-term pilot project, there
was less confidence about its longer-term sustainability, particularly if IBs proved more
popular than conventional services and generated increased demand.
Moreover, social care managers considered that the reintroduction of distinctions
between health and social care was incompatible with the holistic, person-focused
principles underpinning personalisation. Including selected NHS resources in IBs was
considered essential for effective, integrated services for patients and users. Evidence
on the outcomes of collaborative arrangements for health and social care service users
remains weak (Dowling et al., 2004). Nevertheless, implicit in the accounts reported here
was the belief that local collaborations had at least led to greater efficiency and were in
some instances reported to have led to significant benefits for some particularly vulnerable
service users. These gains were now threatened.
One of the conditions for effective partnerships is the identification and agreement
of common goals (Hudson and Hardy, 2002). IBs, and the organisational and cultural
transformations they entailed, involved only social care partners; other evidence from
the IB evaluation (Moran et al., 2010 forthcoming) has shown how implementation of
the IB pilot projects was shaped by narrow social care, rather than wider inter-sectoral,
policy interests. As a consequence, existing local collaborative relationships risked being
undermined and future joint developments jeopardised. Policies to promote partnership
and collaboration between services and sectors have wider and longer-term implications
and may therefore constrain opportunities to introduce new initiatives in one sector only.
This article has focused on only one aspect of the IB pilots. Full details of the outcomes
for IB holders, compared with standard social care services, are available elsewhere
(Glendinning et al., 2008). Moreover, the article draws on only one source of data – the
views and experiences of social care managers leading the IB pilots. Had NHS staff also
been interviewed, it is possible that they would have given different accounts; they would
almost certainly not have experienced the same implementation challenges. Nevertheless,
some IB lead managers reported considerable interest in the pilots among their NHS
counterparts, who were aware of the potential for learning, should similar personalisation
approaches be introduced in the NHS.
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I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r f u t u r e po l i c y an d r e s e a r c h
Since the end of the IB pilots, there have been two relevant developments. First, personal
budgets (similar in principle to IBs) have been extended across English adult social care in
a ‘transformation’ programme between 2008 and 2011 (DH, 2007b). Secondly, Personal
Health Budgets (PHBs), using NHS resources, are being piloted from 2010 (Secretary of
State for Health, 2008). The PHB pilots include services where the social care IB pilots
encountered particular problems – continuing healthcare, mental health services and
some long-term conditions. New legislation allows selected PHB pilots to offer cash direct
payments, so budget-holders can purchase their own support; pilots are urged to develop
assessment and resource allocation systems in partnership with local authority social
care; and integrated personal budgets, including both health and social care resources,
are encouraged (NHS, 2009).
The relationships between these two personalisation initiatives will require careful
evaluation. It remains to be seen how far the PHB pilots will build on the experiences
of social care IBs and on the personal budgets now being mainstreamed across adult
social care. In localities with experience of both, there are major opportunities to build
on local partnerships and offer integrated health and social care personal budgets to those
whose needs span both sectors. Evaluation will need to include the cost and efficiency
implications for health and social care services, and wellbeing-related outcomes for
service users. In localities without personal health budget pilots, greater flexibility may
be needed to allow some health resources to contribute to social care personal budgets.
Given the overarching policy aim of increasing choice and control for users of both
social and health care services, greater flexibility in the use of these respective resources at
individual levels seems essential. From the evidence of the IB pilot projects, such flexibility
would also appear vitally important to the health of local collaborative relationships, in
order to avoid undermining a decade of local collaboration and partnerships.
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Note
1 The NHS has a continuing responsibility to fund all the care needed by people with complex,
intensive or deteriorating healthcare needs, but who can nevertheless be discharged from acute hospital
care – a funding regime effectively equivalent to hospital inpatient status.
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